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Abstract 18 
Notions such as Sunyata, Catuskoti, and Indra‘s Net, which figure prominently in Buddhist 19 
philosophy, are difficult to readily accommodate within our ordinary thinking about everyday 20 
objects.  Famous Buddhist scholar Nagarjuna considered two levels of reality: one called 21 
conventional reality and the other ultimate reality.  Within this framework, Sunyata refers to the 22 
claim that at the ultimate level objects are devoid of essence or ―intrinsic properties‖, but are 23 
interdependent by virtue of their relations to other objects.  Catuskoti refers to the claim that four 24 
truth values, along with contradiction, are admissible in reasoning.  Indra‘s Net refers to the 25 
claim that every part of a whole is reflective of the whole.  Here we present category theoretic 26 
constructions which are reminiscent of these Buddhist concepts.  The universal mapping 27 
property definition of mathematical objects, wherein objects of a universe of discourse are 28 
defined not in terms of their content, but in terms of their relations to all objects of the universe is 29 
reminiscent of Sunyata.  The objective logic of perception, with perception modeled as [a 30 
category of] two sequential processes (sensation followed by interpretation), and with its truth 31 
value object of four truth values, is reminiscent of the Buddhist logic of Catuskoti.  The category 32 
of categories, wherein every category has a subcategory of sets with zero structure within which 33 
every category can be modeled, is reminiscent of Indra‘s Net.  Our thorough elaboration of the 34 
parallels between Buddhist philosophy and category theory can facilitate better understanding of 35 
Buddhist philosophy, and bring out the broader philosophical import of category theory beyond 36 
mathematics.  37 
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Introduction 38 
Buddhist philosophy, especially Nagarjuna‘s Middle Way (Garfield, 1995; Siderits and Katsura, 39 
2013), is intellectually demanding (Priest, 2013).  The sources of the difficulties are many.  First 40 
it argues for two realities: conventional and ultimate (Priest, 2010).  Next, ultimate reality is 41 
characterized by Sunyata or emptiness, which is understood as the absence of a fundamental 42 
essence underlying reality (Priest, 2009).  Equally importantly, contradictions are readily 43 
deployed, especially in Catuskoti, as part of the characterization of reality (Deguchi, Garfield, 44 
and Priest, 2008; Priest, 2014).  Lastly, reality is depicted as Indra‘s Net—a whole, whose parts 45 
are reflective of the whole (Priest, 2015).  The ideas of relational existence, admission of 46 
contradictions, and parts reflecting the whole are seemingly incompatible with our everyday 47 
experiences and the attendant conceptual reasoning used to make sense of reality.  However, 48 
notions analogous to these ancient Buddhist ideas are also encountered in the course of the 49 
modern mathematical conceptualization of reality.  These parallels may be, in large part, due to 50 
‗experience‘ and ‗reason‘ that are treated as the final authority in both mathematical sciences and 51 
Buddhist philosophy.  Here, we highlight the similarities between Buddhist philosophy and 52 
mathematical philosophy, especially category theory (Lawvere and Schanuel, 2009).  The 53 
resultant cross-cultural philosophy can facilitate a proper understanding of reality—a noble goal 54 
to which both Buddhist philosophy and mathematical practice are unequivocally committed. 55 
 56 
Two Realities 57 
There are, according to Buddhist thought, two realities: the conventional reality of our everyday 58 
experiences and the ultimate reality (Priest, 2010; Priest and Garfield, 2003).  In our 59 
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conventional reality, things appear to have intrinsic essences.  It is sensible, at the level of 60 
conventional reality, to speak of essences of objects, but at the level of ultimate reality there are 61 
no essences, and everything exists but only relationally.  There is an analogous situation in 62 
mathematics.  On one hand, mathematical objects can be characterized in terms of their relations 63 
to all objects, in which case the nature of an object is determined by the nature of its relationship 64 
to all objects.  In a sense, there is nothing inside the object; an object is what it is by virtue of its 65 
relations to all objects.  The objects of mathematics are, as Resnik (1981, p. 530) notes, 66 
―positions in structures‖, which is in accord with the Buddhist understanding of things as ―loci in 67 
a field of relations‖ (Priest, 2009, p. 468).  However, there is another level of mathematical 68 
reality, wherein we can speak of essences of objects (e.g. theories of objects; Lawvere and 69 
Rosebrugh, 2003, pp. 154-155).  For example, one can characterize a set as a collection of 70 
elements or ―sum‖ of basic-shaped figures (1-shaped figures, where 1 = {•}), with basic shapes 71 
understood as essences (Lawvere, 1972, p. 135; Lawvere and Schanuel, 2009, p. 245; Reyes, 72 
Reyes, and Zolfaghari, 2004, p. 30).  Similarly, every graph is made up of figures of two basic-73 
shapes (arrow- and dot-shaped figures; Lawvere and Schanuel, 2009, p. 150, 215).  This 74 
characterization of an object in terms of its contents i.e. basic shapes or essences (Lawvere, 75 
2003, pp. 217-219; Lawvere, 2004, pp. 11-13) can be contrasted with the relational 76 
characterization, wherein each and every object of a universe of discourse (a mathematical 77 
category; Lawvere and Schanuel, 2009, p. 17) is characterized in terms of its relationship to all 78 
objects of the universe or category (see Appendix A1).  The relational nature of mathematical 79 
objects, as elaborated below, is reminiscent of the Buddhist notion of emptiness—an assertion 80 
that objects are what they are not by virtue of some intrinsic essences but by virtue of their 81 
mutual relationships. 82 
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 83 
Emptiness 84 
According to Buddhist philosophy, everything is empty and the totality of empty things is empty.  85 
Here, emptiness is understood as the absence of essences.  Things, in the ultimate analysis, are 86 
what they are and behave the way they do not because of [some] essences inherent in them, but 87 
by virtue of their mutual relationships (Priest, 2009).  This idea of relational existence has 88 
parallels in mathematical practice.  Mathematical objects of a given mathematical category (e.g. 89 
category of sets) are what they are not by virtue of their intrinsic essences but by virtue of their 90 
relations to all objects of the category.  For example, a single-element set is a set to which there 91 
exists exactly one function from every set (Lawvere and Schanuel, 2009, p. 213, 225).  Note that 92 
the singleton set is characterized not in terms of what it contains (a single element), but in terms 93 
of how it relates to all sets of the category of sets.  In a similar vein, the truth value set Ω = 94 
{false, true} is defined in terms of its relation to all sets of the category of sets.  The truth value 95 
set, instead of being defined as a set of two elements ‗false‘ and ‗true‘, is defined as a set Ω such 96 
that functions from any set X to the set Ω are in one-to-one correspondence with the parts of X 97 
(ibid, pp. 339-344).  To give one more example, product of two sets is defined not by specifying 98 
the contents of the product set (pairs of elements), but by characterizing its relationship to all 99 
sets.  More explicitly, the product of two sets A and B is a set A × B along with two functions 100 
(projections to the factors) pA: A × B → A, pB: A × B → B such that for every set Q and any pair 101 
of functions qA: Q → A, qB: Q → B, there is exactly one function q: Q → A × B satisfying both 102 
the equations: qA = pA ◦ q and qB = pB ◦ q, where ‗◦‘ denotes composition of functions (ibid, pp. 103 
339-344).  The universal mapping property definition of mathematical constructions brought to 104 
sharp focus the relational nature of mathematical objects.  It conclusively established that ―the 105 
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substance of mathematics resides not in Substance (as it is made to seem when ∈ [membership] 106 
is the irreducible predicate, with the accompanying necessity of defining all concepts in terms of 107 
a rigid elementhood relation) but in Form (as is clear when the guiding notion is isomorphism-108 
invariant structure, as defined, for example, by universal mapping properties)‖ (Lawvere, 2005, 109 
p. 7).  More broadly, Yoneda lemma (Lawvere and Rosebrugh, 2003, pp. 249-250; Appendix 110 
A1), according to which a mathematical object of a given universe of discourse (i.e. category) is 111 
completely characterized by the totality of its relations to all objects of the universe (category), is 112 
an unequivocal assertion of the relational nature of mathematical objects.  Yoneda lemma, as 113 
pointed out by Barry Mazur, establishes that ―an object X of a category C is determined by the 114 
network of relationships that the object X has with all the other objects in C‖ (Mazur, 2008).  115 
Thus the Buddhist idea of emptiness or relational existence finds resonance in mathematical 116 
practice, especially in terms of universal mapping properties and the Yoneda lemma. 117 
However, note that according to the Buddhist doctrine of emptiness, not only is 118 
everything empty, but the totality of empty things is also empty (Priest, 2009).  In other words, 119 
even the notion of relational existence is empty i.e., emptiness is not the essence of existence; 120 
emptiness is also empty.  This idea of emptiness being empty is much more challenging to 121 
comprehend.  When we say that objects are empty, we are saying that objects are mere locations 122 
in a network of relations.  But when we say that the totality of empty things is empty, we are 123 
asserting that the existence of totality is also relational just like that of the objects in the totality.  124 
What is not immediately clear is how are we to think of relations especially when all we have is 125 
the totality i.e., one object.  Within mathematics, note that the totality of all objects (along with 126 
their mutual relations) forms a category.  More importantly, categories are objects in the category 127 
of categories (Lawvere, 1966), and hence the totality of objects i.e. category is also empty or 128 
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relational as much as the objects of a category.  Thus the idea of Sunyata (everything is empty) 129 
resonates with the relational nature of objects and of the totality of objects (within the 130 
mathematical framework of the category of categories). 131 
Equally importantly, Nagarjuna‘s Middle Way, having gone to great lengths to 132 
distinguish two realities (conventional essences vs. ultimate emptiness) identifies the two: ―there 133 
is no distinction between conventional reality and ultimate reality‖ (Deguchi, Garfield, and 134 
Priest, 2008, p. 399).  Contradictions (such as these) within Buddhist philosophy, on a superficial 135 
reading, are diagnostic of irrational mysticism.  However, as we point out in the following, 136 
contradictions also figure prominently in the foundations of mathematical modeling of reality.  In 137 
light of these parallels, ‗contradiction‘ may be intrinsic to the nature of reality, which is the 138 
common subject of both Buddhist and mathematical investigations, and not a sign of faulty 139 
Buddhist reasoning. 140 
 141 
Contradiction 142 
Within the Buddhist philosophical discourse, one often encounters contradictions and these 143 
contradictions are treated as meaningful (Deguchi, Garfield, and Priest, 2008; Priest, 2014).  144 
There is an analogous situation in mathematics.  Though not every contradiction is sensible, 145 
there are sensible contradictions such as the boundary of an object A formalized as ‗A and not A‘ 146 
(Lawvere, 1991, 1994a, p. 48; Lawvere and Rosebrugh, 2003, p. 201).  More importantly, within 147 
mathematical practice, it is now recognized that contradictions do not necessarily lead to 148 
inconsistency (an inconsistent system, according to Tarski, is where everything can be proved; 149 
Lawvere, 2003, p. 214).  Of course, admitting a contradiction invariably leads to inconsistency in 150 
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classical Boolean logic.  In logics more refined than Boolean logic contradiction does not 151 
necessarily lead to inconsistency.  This recognition is very important, especially since 152 
contradiction plays a foundational role in mathematical practice.  Briefly, Cantor‘s definition of 153 
SET is, as pointed out by F. William Lawvere, ―a strong contradiction: its points are completely 154 
distinct and yet indistinguishable‖ (ibid, p. 215; Lawvere, 1994a, pp. 50-51).  Zermelo, and most 155 
mathematicians following him, concluded that Cantor‘s account of sets is ―incorrigibly 156 
inconsistent‖ (Lawvere, 1994b, p. 6).  Lawvere, using adjoint functors, showed that Cantor‘s 157 
definition is ―not a conceptual inconsistency but a productive dialectical contradiction‖ (Lawvere 158 
and Rosebrugh, 2003, pp. 245-246), which is summed up as the unity and identity of adjoint 159 
opposites (Lawvere, 1992, pp. 28-30; Lawvere, 1996). 160 
 A related notion is catuskoti, which is routinely employed in Buddhist reasoning (Priest, 161 
2014; Westerhoff, 2006).  To place it in perspective, in the familiar Boolean logic, any 162 
proposition is either true or false.  Put differently, there are only two possible truth values, and 163 
they are mutually exclusive and jointly exhaustive.  Unlike Boolean logic, in Buddhist reasoning 164 
more than two truth values are admissible.  In the Buddhist logic of Catuskoti, a proposition can 165 
possibly take, in addition to the familiar truth values of ‗true‘ or ‗false‘, the truth values of ‗true 166 
and false‘, or ‗not true and not false‘.  Given a proposition A, there are four possibilities: 1. A, 2. 167 
not A, 3. A and not A, 4. not A and not not A.  Here contradiction is admissible, i.e. ‗A and not 168 
A‘ is a possible state of affairs, which is reminiscent of the boundary operation and the unity and 169 
identity of adjoint opposites in mathematics, alluded to earlier.  Moreover, double negation is not 170 
same as identity operation as in the case of, to give one example, the non-Boolean logic of 171 
graphs (Lawvere and Schanuel, 2009, p. 355).  Note that if not not A = A, then the fourth truth 172 
value of catuskoti is equal to the third. 173 
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As an illustration of how the four truth values of catuskoti could be a reflection [of an 174 
aspect] of reality, we consider the category of percepts.  Perception involves two sequential 175 
processes of sensation followed by interpretation (Albright, 2015; Croner and Albright, 1999).  176 
So, we define the category of percepts as a category of two sequential functions of decoding after 177 
coding.  The truth value object of the category of percepts has four truth values (Appendix A2).  178 
Thus the objective logic of perception, with its truth value object of four truth values, is 179 
reminiscent of the Buddhist logic of catuskoti (see Linton, 2005). 180 
  181 
Indra’s Net and Zero Structure 182 
Another important concept in Buddhist philosophy is the idea of Indra‘s Net, wherein reality is 183 
compared to a vast network of jewels such that every jewel is reflective of the entire net (Priest, 184 
2015).  In abstract terms, reality is characterized as a whole wherein every part is reflective of 185 
the whole.  Admittedly, this Buddhist characterization of reality sounds mystifying, but there is 186 
an analogous situation, involving part-whole relations, in mathematics. 187 
How can a part of a whole reflect the whole?  First, note that mathematical structures of 188 
all sorts can be modeled in the category of sets (Lawvere and Schanuel, 2009, pp. 133-151).  Sets 189 
have zero structure (Lawvere, 1972, p. 1; Lawvere and Rosebrugh, 2003, p. 1, 57; Lawvere and 190 
Schanuel, 2009, p. 146).  Negating the structure (cohesion, variation) inherent in mathematical 191 
objects, Cantor created sets: mathematical structures with zero structure (Lawvere, 2003, 2016; 192 
Lawvere and Rosebrugh, 2003, pp. 245-246).  In comparing his abstraction of sets with zero 193 
structure to the invention of number zero, Cantor considered sets as his most profound 194 
contribution to mathematics (Lawvere, 2006).  Sets, by virtue of having zero structure, serve as a 195 
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blank page—an ideal background to model any category of mathematical objects (Lawvere, 196 
1994b; Lawvere and Rosebrugh, 2003, pp. 154-155).  However, structureless sets are a small 197 
part—the only part—of the mathematical universe which reflects all of mathematics.  It seemed 198 
so until Lawvere axiomatized the category of categories (Lawvere, 1966; Lawvere and Schanuel, 199 
2009, pp. 369-370).  Along the lines of Cantor‘s invention of structureless sets, Lawvere defined 200 
a subcategory of structureless (discrete, constant) objects within a category by negating its 201 
structure (cohesion, variation; Lawvere, 2004, p. 12; Lawvere and Schanuel, 2009, pp. 358-360, 202 
372-377).  Thus, within any category of mathematical objects, there is a part, a structureless 203 
subcategory, which is like the category of sets in having zero structure, and hence serves as a 204 
background to model all categories of mathematical objects (Lawvere, 2003; Lawvere and 205 
Menni, 2015; Picado, 2008, p. 21).  Modeling a category of mathematical objects requires, in 206 
addition to the subcategory with zero structure, another subcategory objectifying the structural 207 
essence(s) of the objects of the category, i.e. the theory of the given category of mathematical 208 
objects.  Finding the theory subcategory also depends on the structureless subcategory, by way of 209 
contrasting or negating the structureless subcategory (Lawvere, 2007).  Once we have the 210 
subcategory with zero structure and the subcategory objectifying the essence (theory) of a given 211 
category, interpreting the theory subcategory into the structureless subcategory gives us models 212 
of the given category of mathematical objects.  Thus, thanks to the recognition of significance of 213 
Cantor‘s zero structure, every mathematical category can be modelled in any category of the 214 
category of categories. 215 
If we compare the category of categories to Indra‘s net, then categories within the 216 
category of categories would correspond to jewels in Indra‘s net.  Just as in the case of Indra‘s 217 
net, wherein every jewel in the network of jewels is reflective of the entire network, in the 218 
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category of categories every category (part) of the category of categories (whole) reflects the 219 
whole.  For example, the category of dynamical systems is a part of the category of categories.  220 
Within the category of dynamical systems, we have the constant subcategory (obtained by 221 
negating the variation) of dynamical systems (wherein every state is a fixed point), which is like 222 
the category of sets, and within which any category can be modeled.  Similarly, the category of 223 
graphs is another part of the category of categories.  Within the category of graphs there is the 224 
discrete subcategory (obtained by negating the cohesion) of graphs (with one loop on each dot), 225 
which is also like the category of sets, and hence can model every category.  Thus, we find that 226 
within the category of categories, every part is reflective of the whole, which is reminiscent of 227 
the Buddhist depiction of reality as Indra‘s Net: a whole with parts reflective of the whole. 228 
 229 
Conclusion 230 
There are similarities between Buddhist philosophy and mathematical practice, especially with 231 
regard to essence vs. emptiness, contradictions, and part-whole relations.  These similarities 232 
might be a natural consequence of identical objectives—understanding reality and commitment 233 
to truth—and identical means—experience and reason—employed towards those ends.  It is in 234 
this respect that the practices of the two—mathematicians and Buddhists—can be compared. Our 235 
exercise, on one hand, can help better appreciate the rationality of Buddhist reasoning.  236 
Oftentimes, admission of contradiction (as in catuskoti) tends to be equated with irrational 237 
mysticism.  However, as we have seen, contradictions are also an integral and indispensable part 238 
of the mathematical understanding of reality.  On the other hand, in drawing parallels between 239 
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Buddhist thought and mathematical practice, we hope to have brought out the broad 240 
philosophical import of category theory beyond mathematics.  241 
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Appendices 242 
 243 
A1. Yoneda lemma 244 
We begin with an intuitive introduction to the mathematical content of Yoneda lemma (Lawvere 245 
and Rosebrugh, 2003, pp. 175-176, 249).  With simple illustrations of figures-and-incidences 246 
(along with [its dual] properties-and-determinations) interpretations of mathematical objects, we 247 
prove the Yoneda lemma (Lawvere and Schanuel, 2009, pp. 361, 370-371).  Broadly speaking, 248 
Yoneda lemma is about [properties of] objects [of categories] and their mutual determination. 249 
First, let us consider a function 250 
f: A → B 251 
We can think of the function f as (i) a figure of shape A in B, i.e., an A-shaped figure in B.  For 252 
example, in the category of graphs, a map 253 
d: D → G 254 
from a graph D (consisting of one dot) to any graph G is a D-shaped figure in G, i.e., a dot in the 255 
graph G.  We can also think of the same function f as (ii) a property of A with values in B, i.e., a 256 
B-valued property of A (Lawvere and Schanuel, 2009, pp. 81-85).  For example, with sets, say, 257 
Fruits = {apple, grape) and Color = {red, green}, a function 258 
c: Fruits → Color 259 
(with c (apple) = red and c (grape) = green) can be viewed as Color-valued property of Fruits. 260 
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 Now let us consider two figures: an X-shaped figure in A 261 
xA: X → A 262 
and a Y-shaped figure in A 263 
yA: Y → A 264 
Given a transformation from the shape X to the shape Y, i.e. an X-shaped figure in Y 265 
xY: X → Y 266 
we find that the X-shaped figure in Y (xY) induces a transformation of a Y-shaped figure in A 267 
into an X-shaped figure in A via composition of maps 268 
yA ◦ xY = xA 269 
(where ‗◦‘ denotes composition) displayed as a commutative diagram 270 
 271 
 272 
 273 
showing the transformation of a Y-shaped figure in A (yA) into an X-shaped figure in A (xA) by 274 
an X-shaped figure in Y (xY) via composition of maps. 275 
As an illustration, consider an object (of the category of graphs) i.e., a graph G (shown 276 
below): 277 
 278 
X 
Y 
A 
xA = yA ◦ xY 
xY 
yA 
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 279 
 280 
 281 
 282 
 283 
and a shape graph [arrow] A with exactly one arrow ‗a‘, along with its source ‗s‘ and target ‗t‘, 284 
as shown: 285 
 286 
along with an A-shaped figure in G 287 
aG: A → G 288 
displayed as: 289 
 290 
 291 
 292 
with, say, 293 
aG (a) = a1 294 
This A-shaped figure in G, i.e. the graph map aG maps the [only] arrow ‗a‘ in the shape graph A 295 
to the arrow ‗a1‘ in the graph G, while respecting the source (s) and target (t) structure of the 296 
d3 
G 
a1 a2 
d1 d2 
A 
a 
s t 
d3 
G 
a1 a2 
d1 d2 
A 
a 
s t 
aG 
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arrow ‗a‘, i.e., with arrow ‗a‘ in shape A mapped to arrow ‗a1‘ in the graph G, the source ‗s‘ and 297 
target ‗t‘ of the arrow ‗a‘ are mapped to the source ‗d1‘ and target ‗d3‘ of arrow ‗a1‘, respectively.  298 
Next, consider another shape graph [dot] D with exactly one dot ‗d‘ 299 
 300 
along with a D-shaped figure in A 301 
dA: D → A 302 
with 303 
dA (d) = s 304 
i.e., the graph map dA maps the dot ‗d‘ in the graph D to the dot ‗s‘ in the graph A, i.e. the source 305 
dot ‗s‘ of the arrow ‗a‘, as shown below: 306 
 307 
 308 
This graph map dA from shape D to shape A induces a transformation of the (above) A-shaped 309 
figure in graph G 310 
aG: A → G 311 
into a D-shaped figure in G 312 
dG: D → G 313 
via composition of graph maps 314 
dA 
D d 
s A t 
a 
D 
d 
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dG = aG ◦ dA 315 
i.e., dG (d) = aG ◦ dA (d) = aG (s) = d1  316 
as depicted below (Lawvere and Schanuel, 2009, pp. 149-150): 317 
 318 
 319 
 320 
 321 
In general, every X-shaped figure in Y transforms a Y-shaped figure in A into an X-322 
shaped figure in A i.e., every map 323 
xY: X → Y 324 
induces a map in the opposite direction (contravariant; Lawvere, 2017; Lawvere and Rosebrugh, 325 
2003, p. 103; Lawvere and Schanuel, 2009, p. 338) 326 
A
xY
: A
Y
 → AX 327 
where A
Y
 is the map object of the totality of all Y-shaped figures in A, A
X
 is the map object of 328 
the totality of all X-shaped figures in A, and with the map A
xY
 of map objects defined as 329 
A
xY
 (yA: Y → A) = yA ◦ xY = xA: X → A 330 
d3 
G 
a1 a2 
d1 d2 
dA 
D d 
s A t 
a 
dG 
aG 
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assigning a map xA in the map object A
X
 to each map yA in the map object A
Y
.  Thus, the figures 331 
in an object A of all shapes (all X-shaped figures in A for every object X of a category) along 332 
with their incidences 333 
A
xY
: A
Y
 → AX 334 
induced by all changes of figure shapes 335 
xY: X → Y 336 
(i.e. every map in the category) together constitute the geometry of figures in A, i.e., a complete 337 
picture of the object A.  Summing up, we have the complete characterization of the geometry of 338 
every object A of a category in terms of the figures of all shapes (objects of the category) and 339 
their incidences (induced by the maps of the category) in the object A (Lawvere and Schanuel, 340 
2009, pp. 370-371). 341 
Let us now examine how figures of a shape X in an object A are transformed into figures 342 
of the [same] shape X in an object B.  We find that an A-shaped figure in B 343 
aB: A → B 344 
induces a transformation of an X-shaped figure in A 345 
xA: X → A 346 
into an X-shaped figure in B 347 
xB: X → B 348 
via composition of maps 349 
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X xB = aB ◦ xA 
A B 
xA 
aB 
aB ◦ xA = xB 350 
displayed as a commutative diagram 351 
 352 
 353 
showing the transformation of an X-shaped figure in A (xA) into an X-shaped figure in B (xB) by 354 
an A-shaped figure in B (aB) via composition of maps.  Thus, every map 355 
aB: A → B 356 
induces a map in the same direction (covariant; Lawvere and Rosebrugh, 2003, pp. 102-103, 357 
109; Lawvere and Schanuel, 2009, p. 319) 358 
aB
X
: A
X
 → BX 359 
where A
X
 is the map object of all X-shaped figures in A, B
X
 is the map object of all X-shaped 360 
figures in B, and with the map aB
X
 defined as 361 
aB
X
 (xA: X → A) = aB ◦ xA = xB: X → B 362 
assigning a map xB in the map object B
X
 to each map xA in the map object A
X
.  Thus, the totality 363 
of maps aB
X
 of map objects (for all objects and maps of the category) induced by a map aB from 364 
A to B constitutes a covariant transformation of the figure geometry of object A into that of B, 365 
i.e., specifies how figures-and-incidences in A are transformed into figures-and-incidences in B. 366 
 Putting together these two transformations: (i) the covariant transformation of X-shaped 367 
figures in A into X-shaped figures in B induced by an A-shaped figure in B, and (ii) the 368 
20 
 
A 
Y 
X 
B xY 
xB 
xA 
yB 
aB 
yA 
contravariant transformation of Y-shaped figures in A into X-shaped figures in A induced by an 369 
X-shaped figure in Y, we obtain the diagram (Lawvere and Schanuel, 2009, p. 370): 370 
 371 
 372 
 373 
 374 
from which we notice that there are two paths to go from a Y-shaped figure in A (yA) to an X-375 
shaped figure in B (xB): 376 
Path 1. First we map the Y-shaped figure in A (yA) into an X-shaped figure in A (xA) along the 377 
X-shaped figure in Y (xY) via composition of the maps 378 
yA ◦ xY 379 
and then map the composite X-shaped figure in A (yA ◦ xY) into an X-shaped figure in B along 380 
the A-shaped figure in B (aB) via composition 381 
aB ◦ (yA ◦ xY) 382 
Path 2. First we map the Y-shaped figure in A (yA) into a Y-shaped figure in B (yB) along the A-383 
shaped figure in B (aB) via composition of the maps 384 
aB ◦ yA 385 
and then map the composite Y-shaped figure in B (aB ◦ yA) into an X-shaped figure in B along 386 
the X-shaped figure in Y (xY) via composition 387 
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(aB ◦ yA) ◦ xY 388 
Based on the associativity of composition of maps (Lawvere and Schanuel, 2009, pp. 370-371), 389 
we find that 390 
aB ◦ (yA ◦ xY) = (aB ◦ yA) ◦ xY 391 
i.e., the two paths of transforming a Y-shaped figure in A 392 
yA: Y → A 393 
into an X-shaped figure in B give the same map 394 
aB ◦ yA ◦ xY = xB: X → B 395 
Since the associativity of composition of maps hold for all maps of any category (Lawvere and 396 
Schanuel, 2009, p. 17), we find that every A-shaped figure in B induces a covariant 397 
transformation of the figure geometry of A into the figure geometry of B.  More explicitly, each 398 
A-shaped figure in B 399 
aB: A → B 400 
induces a commutative diagram (of maps of map objects) 401 
 402 
 403 
 404 
satisfying 405 
A
X
 B
X
 
aB
X
 
A
xY
 B
xY
 
aB
Y
 
A
Y
 B
Y
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aB
X
 ◦ A
xY
 = B
xY
 ◦ aB
Y
 406 
for every map in the category, and hence a natural transformation (compatible with the 407 
composition of maps) of the figure geometry of A into the figure geometry of B.  To see the 408 
commutativity, consider a Y-shaped figure in A, i.e. a map yA of the map object A
Y
 and evaluate 409 
the above two composites: 410 
aB
X
 ◦ A
xY
 (yA) = aB
X
 (yA ◦ xY) = aB ◦ (yA ◦ xY) 411 
B
xY
 ◦ aB
Y
 (yA) = B
xY
 (aB ◦ yA) = (aB ◦ yA) ◦ xY 412 
Again, according to the associativity of the composition of maps 413 
aB ◦ (yA ◦ xY) = (aB ◦ yA) ◦ xY = aB ◦ yA ◦ xY 414 
and hence both composites map each Y-shaped figure in A (a map in the map object A
Y
)  415 
yA: Y → A 416 
to the X-shaped figure in B (a map in the map object B
X
) 417 
aB ◦ yA ◦ xY = xB: X → B 418 
Since we have the above commutativity for every shape (object) and figure (map), i.e. for all 419 
objects and maps of the category, we conclude that an A-shaped figure in B corresponds to a 420 
natural transformation (respectful of figures-and-incidences) of the figure geometry of A into the 421 
figure geometry of B. 422 
 Now we formally show that every A-shaped figure in B 423 
aB: A → B 424 
23 
 
of a category C can be represented as a natural transformation 425 
n
aB
: C (–, A) → C (–, B) 426 
from the domain functor C (–, A) constituting the figure geometry of the object A to the 427 
codomain functor C (–, B) constituting the figure geometry of the object B, which is the core 428 
mathematical content of the Yoneda lemma (Lawvere and Rosebrugh, 2003, p. 249): ―maps in 429 
any category can be represented as natural transformations‖ (Lawvere and Schanuel, 2009, p. 430 
378).  Since natural transformations represent structure-preserving maps between objects, the 431 
domain (codomain) functor of a natural transformation represents the domain (codomain) object 432 
of the structure-preserving map. 433 
 Let us define the (domain) functor 434 
C (–, A): C → C 435 
as: for each object X of the category C 436 
C (–, A) (X) = AX 437 
where A
X
 is the map object of all X-shaped figures in A 438 
xA: X → A 439 
and, for each map 440 
xY: X → Y 441 
of the category C 442 
C (–, A) (xY: X → Y) = A
xY
: A
Y
 → AX 443 
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where A
Y
 is the map object of all Y-shaped figures in A, and with the map A
xY
 of map objects 444 
defined as 445 
A
xY
 (yA: Y → A) = yA ◦ xY = xA: X → A 446 
assigning a map xA in the map object A
X
 to each map yA in the map object A
Y
.  Thus the functor 447 
C (–, A): C → C 448 
in assigning to each map 449 
xY: X → Y 450 
(of the domain category C) its [induced] map [of map objects] 451 
C (–, A) (xY: X → Y) = C (–, A) (Y) → C (–, A) (X) = A
xY
: A
Y
 → AX 452 
(of the codomain category C) is contravariant, i.e. a transformation of a shape X into a shape Y 453 
induces a transformation (in the opposite direction) of Y-shaped figures in A into X-shaped 454 
figures in A (Lawvere and Rosebrugh, 2003, pp. 236-237). 455 
Now, we check to see if C (–, A) preserves identities, i.e. whether 456 
C (–, A) (1X: X → X) = 1C (–, A) (X) 457 
for every object X.  Evaluating 458 
C (–, A) (1X: X → X) = A
1X
: A
X
 → AX 459 
at a map 460 
xA: X → A 461 
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we find that 462 
A
1X
 (xA: X → A) = (xA ◦ 1X) = xA: X → A 463 
(for every map xA in the map object A
X
).  Next, evaluating 464 
1C (–, A) (X) = 1AX: A
X
 → AX 465 
at the map 466 
xA: X → A 467 
we find that 468 
1
AX
 (xA: X → A) = (xA ◦ 1X) = xA: X → A 469 
(for every map xA in the map object A
X
).  Since 470 
A
1X
 = 1
AX
 471 
i.e. 472 
C (–, A) (1X: X → X) = 1C (–, A) (X) 473 
for every object X of the category C, we say C (–, A) preserves identities. 474 
Next, we check to see if C (–, A) preserves composition.  Since C (–, A) is contravariant, 475 
we check whether 476 
C (–, A) (yZ ◦ xY) = C (–, A) (xY) ◦ C (–, A) (yZ) 477 
where yZ: Y → Z.  Evaluating 478 
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C (–, A) (yZ ◦ xY) = A
(yZ ◦ xY)
 479 
at any map zA in the map object A
Z
, we find that 480 
A
(yZ ◦ xY)
 (zA) = zA ◦ (yZ ◦ xY) 481 
Next, we evaluate 482 
C (–, A) (xY) ◦ C (–, A) (yZ) = (A
xY
 ◦ A
yZ
)  483 
also at the map zA 484 
(A
xY
 ◦ A
yZ
) (zA) = A
xY
 (zA ◦ yZ) = (zA ◦ yZ) ◦ xY 485 
Since 486 
zA ◦ (yZ ◦ xY) = (zA ◦ yZ) ◦ xY 487 
by the associativity of the composition of maps, we have composition preserved 488 
C (–, A) (yZ ◦ xY) = C (–, A) (xY) ◦ C (–, A) (yZ) 489 
Having checked that 490 
C (–, A): C → C 491 
with 492 
C (–, A) (X) = AX 493 
C (–, A) (xY: X → Y) = A
xY
: A
Y
 → AX 494 
where A
xY
 (yA) = yA ◦ xY, is a contravariant functor, we consider another contravariant functor 495 
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C (–, B): C → C 496 
with 497 
C (–, B) (X) = BX 498 
C (–, B) (xY: X → Y) = B
xY
: B
Y
 → BX 499 
where B
xY
 (yB) = yB ◦ xY. 500 
With the two functors C (–, A) and C (–, B) representing the [figure geometry of] objects 501 
A and B, respectively, we now show that every structure-preserving map 502 
aB: A → B 503 
is represented by a natural transformation 504 
n
aB
: C (–, A) → C (–, B) 505 
More explicitly, given a map aB, we can construct a natural transformation n
aB
.  A natural 506 
transformation n
aB
 from the functor C (–, A): C → C to the functor C (–, B): C → C assigns to 507 
each object X of the domain category C (of both domain and codomain functors) a map 508 
aB
X
: A
X
 → BX  509 
(in the common codomain category C) from the value of the domain functor at the object X, i.e. 510 
C (–, A) (X) = AX to the value of the codomain functor at X, i.e. C (–, B) (X) = BX; and to each 511 
map xY: X → Y (in the common domain category C), a commutative square (in the common 512 
codomain category C) shown below: 513 
 514 
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 515 
 516 
 517 
 518 
 519 
satisfying 520 
aB
X
 ◦ A
xY
 = B
xY
 ◦ aB
Y
 521 
(Lawvere and Rosebrugh, 2003, p. 241; Lawvere and Schanuel, 2009, pp. 369-370).  We have 522 
already seen that with the composition-induced maps (of map objects): 523 
A
xY
 (yA) = yA ◦ xY 524 
aB
X
 (xA) = aB ◦ xA 525 
aB
Y
 (yA) = aB ◦ yA 526 
B
xY
 (yB) = yB ◦ xY 527 
the required commutativity: 528 
aB
X
 ◦ A
xY
 (yA) = aB
X
 (yA ◦ xY) = aB ◦ (yA ◦ xY) 529 
B
xY
 ◦ aB
Y
 (yA) = B
xY
 (aB ◦ yA) = (aB ◦ yA) ◦ xY 530 
is given by the associativity of the composition of maps 531 
A
X
 B
X
 
aB
X
 
A
xY
 B
xY
 
aB
Y
 
A
Y
 B
Y
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aB ◦ (yA ◦ xY) = (aB ◦ yA) ◦ xY = aB ◦ yA ◦ xY 532 
Thus, each A-shaped figure in B (aB) is a natural transformation (n
aB
; homogenous with respect 533 
to composition of maps) of the figure geometry C (–, A) of A into the figure geometry C (–, B) 534 
of B. 535 
Furthermore, we can obtain the set |B
A
| of all A-shaped figures in B based on the 1-1 536 
correspondence between A-shaped figures in B and the points (i.e. maps with terminal object T 537 
of the category C as domain; Lawvere and Schanuel, 2009, pp. 232-234) of the map object B
A
.  538 
This 1-1 correspondence, which follows from the universal mapping property defining 539 
exponentiation, along with the fact that the terminal object T is a multiplicative identity 540 
(Lawvere and Schanuel, 2009, pp. 261-263, 313-314, 322-323), involves the following two 1-1 541 
correspondences between three maps: 542 
 543 
 544 
 545 
Yoneda lemma says, in terms of our figures-and-incidences characterization of objects, 546 
that the set |B
A
| of A-shaped figures in B 547 
aB: A → B 548 
is isomorphic to the set |C (–, B)C (–, A)| of natural transformations 549 
n
aB
: C (–, A) → C (–, B) 550 
of the figure geometry of A into that of B.  The required isomorphism of sets 551 
T → BA 
T × A → B 
A → B 
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|B
A
| = |C (–, B)C (–, A)| 552 
follows from the 1-1 correspondence between A-shaped figures in B and the natural 553 
transformations (compatible with all figures and their incidences) of the figure geometry of A 554 
into that of B, which we have already shown (see also Lawvere and Rosebrugh, 2003, p. 104, 555 
174). 556 
 Dually, a map 557 
A → B 558 
viewed as a B-valued property on A induces a natural transformation 559 
C (B, –) → C (A, –) 560 
of the function algebra of B into that of A (Lawvere and Rosebrugh, 2003, p. 249).  Here also the 561 
proof of Yoneda lemma involves two transformations: (i) Contravariant: a map from an object A 562 
to an object B induces a transformation of properties of B into properties of A, for each type 563 
(object) of the category, and (ii) Covariant: a map from a type T to a type R (of properties) 564 
induces a transformation of T-valued properties into R-valued properties, for every object of the 565 
category.  The calculations involved in proving Yoneda lemma in this case of function algebras 566 
are same as in the case of figure geometries, except for the reversal of arrows due to the duality 567 
between function algebra and figure geometry (Lawvere and Rosebrugh, 2003, p. 174; Lawvere 568 
and Schanuel, 2009, pp. 370-371).  More specifically, function algebras and figure geometries 569 
are related by adjoint functors (Lawvere, 2016).  570 
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A2. Four Truth Values of the Logic of Perception 571 
Conscious perception involves two sequential processes of sensation followed by interpretation: 572 
Physical stimuli → Brain → Conscious Percepts 573 
(Albright, 2015; Croner and Albright, 1999), which can be thought of as 574 
X – coding → Y – decoding → Z 575 
and objectified as two sequential processes: 576 
A – f → B – g → C 577 
Without discounting that the processes of sensation and interpretation are much more structured 578 
than mere functions, and with the objective of simplifying the calculation of truth value object, 579 
we model percept as an object made up of three [component] sets C, B, and A, which are sets of 580 
physical stimuli, their neural codes, and interpretations, respectively, and two [structural] 581 
functions f and g specifying for each interpretation in A the neural code in B (of which it is an 582 
interpretation) and for each neural code in B the physical stimulus in C (of which it is a 583 
measurement), respectively (see Lawvere and Rosebrugh, 2003, pp. 114-117).  The logic of [the 584 
category of] perception, whose objects are two sequential functions is determined by its truth 585 
value object (Lawvere and Rosebrugh, 2003, pp. 193-212; Lawvere and Schanuel, 2009, pp. 586 
335-357; Reyes, Reyes, and Zolfaghari, 2004, pp. 93-107).  The truth value object of a category 587 
is an object Ω of the category such that parts of any object X are in 1-1 correspondence with 588 
maps from the object X to the truth value object Ω.  Since parts of an object are monomorphisms 589 
with the object X as codomain, for each monomorphism with X as codomain there is a 590 
corresponding X-shaped figure in Ω. 591 
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In order to calculate the truth value object, first we need to define maps between objects 592 
of the category of percepts.  A map from an object 593 
A – f → B – g → C 594 
to an object 595 
A‘ – f’ → B‘ – g’ → C‘ 596 
is a triple of functions 597 
p: A → A‘, q: B → B‘, r: C → C‘ 598 
satisfying two equations 599 
q ◦ f = f’ ◦ p, r ◦ g = g’ ◦ q 600 
which make the two squares in the diagram 601 
 602 
 603 
 604 
 605 
 606 
commute, i.e. ensure that maps between objects preserve the structural essence of the category 607 
(Lawvere and Schanuel, 2009, pp. 149-150). 608 
p 
A A‘ 
f’ f 
q 
B B‘ 
g’ g 
r 
C C‘ 
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Now that we have maps of the category of percepts defined, we can calculate its truth 609 
value object.  The truth value object of a category is calculated based on the parts of the basic 610 
shapes (essence) constituting the objects of the category.  In the category of sets, one-element set 611 
1 (= {•}) is the basic shape in the sense any set is made up of elements (see Posina, Ghista, and 612 
Roy, 2017 for the details of the calculation of basic shapes, i.e. theory subcategories of various 613 
categories).  Since the set 1 is the also the terminal object (i.e. an object to which there is exactly 614 
one map from every object; Lawvere and Schanuel, 2009, pp. 213-214) of the category of sets, 615 
and since every set is completely determined by its points (terminal object-shaped figures), we 616 
can determine the truth value object of the category of sets by determining its points, i.e. maps 617 
from 1 to the (yet to be determined) truth value object.  According to the definition of truth value 618 
object, 1-shaped figures in the truth value object are in 1-1 correspondence with parts of 1.  Since 619 
the terminal set 1 has two parts: 0 (= {}) and 1, the truth value set has two points (elements).  620 
Thus, the truth value object of the category of sets is 2 (= {false, true}). 621 
Along similar lines, let us calculate the terminal object of the category of percepts.  Since 622 
there is only one map from any object (two sequential functions) to the object T (two sequential 623 
functions from one-element set to one-element set): 624 
1 → 1 → 1 625 
the terminal object of the category of percepts is T.  Since parts of the terminal object T 626 
correspond to the points of the truth value object, let‘s look at the parts of the terminal object.  627 
The terminal object T 628 
1 → 1 → 1 629 
has four parts: 630 
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Part 1 (0: 0 → T) 631 
 632 
 633 
 634 
Part 2 (01: 01 → T) 635 
 636 
 637 
 638 
Part 3 (02: 02 → T) 639 
 640 
 641 
 642 
Part 4 (1: T → T) 643 
 644 
 645 
 646 
These four parts correspond to the four points (global truth values) of the truth value object, 647 
which means that the component set (of the truth value object) corresponding to the stage of 648 
1 → 1 
↓ 
1 → 1 
↓ 
1 → 
↓ 
1 
↓ 
0 1 
↓ 
0 1 
↓ 
1 → 1 
0 1 
↓ 
1 → 1 
↓ 
1 → 1 
↓ 
0 1 
↓ 
0 1 
↓ 
0 1 
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interpretations is a four-element set 4 = {0, 01, 02, 1}.  Since objects in the category of perception 649 
(two sequential functions) are not completely determined by points, we look for all other basic 650 
shapes that are needed to completely characterize any object of two sequential functions.  The 651 
other basic shapes, besides the terminal object T, are: domains of the parts 02 and 01 of the 652 
terminal object T, i.e. shape 02 653 
0     1 → 1 654 
and shape 01 655 
0     0     1 656 
Since the basic shape object 02 has three parts (0, 01, and 1), there are three 02-shaped figures in 657 
the truth value object, and since the object 01 has two parts (0 and 1), there are two 01-shaped 658 
figures in the truth value object, which means that the component set (of the truth value object) 659 
corresponding to the stage of neural coding is a three-element set 3 = {0, 01, 1}, while the 660 
component set (of the truth value object) corresponding to the stage of physical stimuli is a two-661 
element set 2 = {0, 1}.  Putting it all together we find that the truth value object of the category 662 
of percepts is: 663 
4 – j → 3 – k → 2 664 
We still have to determine the functions j and k, which can be done by examining the structural 665 
maps between the basic shapes 666 
01 – c → 02 – d → T 667 
which as a subcategory constitutes the theory (abstract essence) of the category of two sequential 668 
functions.  More explicitly, the incidence relations between the three basic-shaped figures in the 669 
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truth value object are calculated from the inverse images of the parts of the basic shapes (01, 02, 670 
and T) along the structural maps (d and c).  The inverse images of each one of the four points (0, 671 
01, 02, and 1 corresponding to the four parts of the terminal object T) along the structural maps 672 
decoding d and coding c give for each one of the four global truth values 4 = {0, 01, 02, 1} its 673 
value in the truth value sets 3 = {0, 01, 1} and 2 = {0, 1} of the previous stages of neural codes 674 
and physical stimuli.  For example, the global truth value 02 corresponds to the part 02 of the 675 
basic shape T, and its inverse image along the structural map d: 02 → T is the entire basic shape 676 
02, which corresponds to the truth value 1 (of stage 3); and the inverse image of the entire object 677 
02 along the structural map c: 01 → 02 is the entire basic shape 01, which corresponds to the truth 678 
value 1 (of stage 2).  Along these lines we find that 679 
j (0) = 0, j (01) = 01, j (02) = 1, j (1) = 1 680 
k (0) = 0, k (01) = 1, k (1) = 1 681 
which completely characterizes the truth value object 682 
4 – j → 3 – k → 2 683 
of the category of percepts.684 
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